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Draft Recommendolion
on a Europeon inulligence polity
The Assembly,
(2 
___Bg"ognrsing that, withthe adoption of the document " European security: a common concept of the
27 WEU countries " in Madrid on 14 November 1995, a fust step has been taken in assessing how these
countries can contribute to security and stability in Europe and elsewhere in the world, particularly by
intensifying political dialogue and enhancing European capabilities in the field of crisis prevention anil
management;
(ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Madrid on 14 November 1995 to sfrengthen further WEU's ope-
rational capabilities ;(iii) Welcoming the decision to establish a new politico-military group in support of the Council and to
provide WEU with a situation centre and an intelligence section in the Planning Cell;
U9 Welcoming the Secretary General's study on the Situation Centre and the Intelligence Section in the
Planning CeIl and the preparatory measures for its implementation, but regretting ttrat too little progress
has been made in this field;
(v). Welcoming the fact that there is an increasing number of " forces answerable to WEU ", strength-
ening Europe's own military capabilities for operations conducted pursuant to the Petersberg Declaration;(yi) Endo_rsing the Council's decision to establish the Satellite Centre as a permanent WEU body and its
objective of developing WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes;
(yil Stressing the importance of the ministerial decision to instruct the Space Group to continue its acti-
vities and define the basic conditions for possible WEU participation in a developing multilateral Euro-
pean programme and to study questions related to a possible WEU ground segment;
(viii) Aware that there is still a considerable gap between the implementation of the initial political idea
which resulted in the creation of the WEU Satellite Centre and the security constraints connected with the
provision and use of data from the Helios 1 satellite;
(i.x) Noting at the same time that satellite intelligence is important and extremely useful, but that it is
only one of the many different elements enabling a complete asiessment of a specifiC situation to be made;(x) Aware of the existence of the document on " Intelligence support to the Planning Cell: short-term
measures ";
(xj) Attacning gr-egt importance to the common reflection on new European security conditions of the
27 WEU nations which has already resulted in identifying their common inierests as well as potential risks
to European security;
@ii) Ngtiog that WEU can only be promoted as a useful forum for analysis and consultation on the
defence implications of security issues of the common foreign and security policy and as an instrument to
facilitate the formulation and implementation of EU decisions and actioni ielated to the Petersberg tasks
if it can rely upon a common European intelligence policy;
(.rliil Noting that there is a need for intensified intelligence cooperation within the framework of WEU
due to the fact that European armed forces are being prepared fofthe implementation of Petersberg tasks,
possibly without the support of United States assets;
@iv1 Noting that European intelligence efforts would have to concentrate on possible new risks and
threats;
(xv) Awarc that the existing bilateral cooperation between different WEU member states in intelligence
questions is not a satisfactory basis for a common European intelligence policy;
(ni) Aware that some WEU member states have established specific links with the Planning Cell in
order to provide it with information on current affairs;
(ruir) Noting that there_is.a need to enlarge the size of the Intelligence Section in the WEU Planning Cell,
as is now being planned, in order to enable the Planning Cell to perform its planning task properly;-
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(niiil Considering that if member states seriously wish to enhance the operational capability of WEU,
they should improve the effectiveness of the Planning Cell by agreeing to second a corespondent from
their national intelligence services to the Planning Cell;
(xix) Recognising that NAIO has a database at its disposal with indispensable information which could
help WEU to make a thorough assessment and analysis of the politico-military situation in Europe, if need
be;
(xx) Considering that the links between WEU and NAIO must be strengthened in order to share the
intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of
Petersberg tasks;
(r"xil Aware of the difficulties encountered in implementing the combined joint task forces concept which
was adopted almost two years ago at the NATO summit of January 1994 and, at the same time, of the fact
that too little progress has been made in the discussions on WEU-NATO cooperation regarding intelli-
gence;
(xrii) Stressing that under these circumstances WEU cannot afford to rely completely on the eventual
availability of the Atlantic Alliance's assets and capabilities and that, as a consequence, it will have to
develop 
- 
among other things 
- 
a common European intelligence policy;
(xxiiil Noting that the national governments of WEU member states are increasingly less able to assess
independently the different risks and threats to the security of Europe as a whole and that, as a conse-
quence, they will be obliged gradually to build a multilateral European network for the permanent sharing
of intelligence data and resources;
(xxiv) Recognising that increased synergy in European intelligence capacities would be an important
contribution to the status of Europe as an equal partner in the ftansatlantic relationship;
(xru) Stressing that for a fulI assessment of risks and threats to Europe's security, political and military
intelligence must go hand-in-hand with intelligence on economic, financial, social and environmental
developments;
(tcxvi) Aurar:e that intelligence cooperation, let alone the establishment of a common European intelligence
policy, are sensitive issues where, due to many psychological and political obstacles and deep-rooted mis-
trust, no spectacular progress can be made overnight,
RecoIvtrvIENDS Truff rrm CouNcr-
1. Strengthen the links between WEU and NATO with a view to sharing the intelligence required for
operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg iasks;
2. Ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from its national intelligence system to the
Planning Cell in order to improve its capabilities in making up-to-date assessments and analyses of the
situation in potential Petersberg task-theatres of operation.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submifred by Mr Baumel Chairman and Ropporteur)
I.Introd.uctian
1. In the Maastricht Treaty, concluded by the
EC member states in 1991, they referred to the
perspective of a " common foreign and security
policy including the eventual framing of a com-
mon defence policy, which might in time lead to a
common defence'0. The WEU Maastricht Decla-
ration of December 1991 defined therole of WEU
as " the defence component of the European
Union and as a means to strenglhen the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance ".
2. Since 1991, a number of activities have
been launched in order to implement the decisions
taken in Maastricht. Relations have been devel-
oped between the European Union and WEU and
also between NATO and WEU. Initiatives have
been taken to develop the operational role of
WEU. But in all the above, very little attention
has been paid to intelligence, which is the basic
condition for any foreign, security and defence
policy. Understandably there has been, and still is,
some reluctance in the member states to do any-
thing which suggests the integration of national
intelligence services into a supranational frame-
work. So many historical, psychological, or prac-
tical reasons could be put forward to postpone
close cooperation in this field on a multilateral
basis.
3. On the other hand, recent major crises such
as the Gulf war and the crisis in former Yugosla-
via, to mention only two, have been traumatic
enough to convey the message that if Europe is
serious in achieving its objective of a common
foreign, security and defence policy, there is an
urgent requirement for a common European intel-
ligence policy.
4. It would be wrong to think that a common
intelligence system, however well-organised, will
always be able to predict accurately the outbreak
of a crisis or conflict. Intelligence services may be
aware of the seeds of a conflict and its underlying
causes but none of them, not even the most
brilliant, is able to predict the human behaviour
which lights the spark that makes the powder keg
explode.
5. It should be kept in mind that the main pur-
pose of intelligence is not simply to predict crises
and trigger timely diplomatic action in order to
prevent conflict or war. Good intelligence, it is
true, may conEibute to the effectiveness of pre-
ventive diplomacy. The main objective of intelli-
gence, however, is the collection and acquisition
of information from different sources in order to
build and update an extensive database and to pro-
vide analyses based on this information. Analyses
and continuously updated information may help
governments to follow the right course in their
foreign policy and to take the right diplomatic or
even military action in crisis situations.
II. What kind of intelligence does Europe need
and can it be mnnaged in a supranational
European framework?
6. In the post-cold war world, old concepts,
based on the antagonism between East and West,
no longer apply.Intelligence cannot escape re-
definition and adaptation to a new geostrategic
situation.
7. The bipolar world with its fairly clear-cut
division of spheres of influence and interests left
relatively little to the imagination. Without sim-
pt$ing too much, one could say that the western
allies were united in their common effort to pro-
tect their territory and their worldwide interests
against a real or perceived threat from the Soviet
Union, in particular, and from the communist
world in general. Understandably, this was the
main focal point of intelligence in the western
world. That situation has now changed radically
and security in the greater part of the world is in a
state of flux, compelling European states with
worldwide economic and political interests to
readjust and step up their intelligence activities.
Moreover, it should be noted that new threats are
numerous and not always easy to interpret and
analyse without deep background intelligence. At
the same time, with the disappearance of an
obvious cofllmon threat, national interests 
- 
even
in the case of allies 
- 
are diverging, depending on
the nature of different threats. Even between the
Atlantic allies there are differences of opinion on
how to deal with crises and otherphenomena. The
different policies of Europe and the United States
towards Bosnia and Iran are only two of the most
conspicuous examples.
8. France has understood this message. Intel-
ligence is one of the four principal operational
tasks which the government has designated in the
1996 defence budget. After deterrence, force pro-jection and protection, the fourth task is preven-
tion, which includes intelligence, space and com-
munications. Prevention is one of the few defence
DOCUIvE}{I1517
sectors which will not be affected by budget
constraints and with a budget of 23.1 billion
francs and 57 555 personnel in 1996, it accounts
for I2.2Vo of the defence budget and 9.6Vo of per-
sonnel against l2%o and 9.4Vo rcspectively in
1995.
9. France has a wide array of intelligence
gathering hardware, which includes the observa-
tion and communication satellites Helios and Syra-
cuse, reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft,
elecfronic warfare equipment and spy ships. It has
three major intelligence services: the general direc-
torate for external security (DGSE), the directorate
for military intelligence (DRM) and the directorate
for protection and defence security (DPSD). In
addition to these, there is the delegation for strate-
gic affairs (DAS). In particular, the DRM and
DGSE will be considerably enlarged between now
and the year 2000. The DRM, employing 1600
staff at the moment, will have 19@ by the year
2000. The DGSE with 2 500 civilian and 1 500
military staff will have an exfra 500 civilian and
200 military staffby the year 200 '.
10. Apparently, intelligence today is of neces-
sity an expanding activity covering an exfremely
wide area of interest. The former French military
intelligence director, General Jean Heinrich, has
indicated that the scope for military intelligence
now reaches way beyond pure military facts and
mere analysis of opposing forces. He prefers to
speak of " military interest intelligence " which,
according to his definitiono oo is the combination of
knowledge and inforrnation of all kinds that the
political or military decision-maker needs in order
to take his decision ". This activity would encom-
pass more than the military domain and cover
widely differing areas such as the ethnological,
historical, social and cultural environments.
11. The present geostrategic situation has
become far too complicated for individual Euro-
pean nations to keep up with all relevant develop-
ments taking place in different parts of the world
and analyse them in detail. Limited and often still
further diminishing intelligence budgets go hand
in hand with an increasing number of hotbeds of
tension and potential or real crises which may,
some day, threaten Europe's economic or security
interests.
12. What are the subjects and issues on which
European intelligence will need to concentrate?
The document " European security: a common
concept of the 27 WEU countries " provides a
more or less comprehensive inventory of all pos-
sible risks and threats to stability and security in
Europe and the rest of the world, on which infor-
mation and in-depth analyses would certainly be
extremely useful.
13. Moreover, economic intelligence, which
has been a relatively neglected field of interest, is
bound to become increasingly important, given
the fierce competition between a growing number
of economic entities for their share of the world
market. Obviously, economic intelligence
includes financial, social, ethnological, enviton-
mental and indusrial intelligence.
L4. In this framework, it is to be noted that
more use can be made of public sources for the
acquisition of data through the media, commercial
databanks or other legal means. The recent deve-
lopment and stormy expansion of Internet is just
one example of an open source which seems to
offer almost unlimited information. In the pres-
ent-day world of open societies and easily acces-
sible worldwide information and communication
systems, this kind of intelligence gathering will be
an increasingly important complement to the
more traditional and often costly covert methods.
15. Is it realistic to conceive of the establish-
ment of a supranational European intelligence
policy given that member states of the European
Union do not wish to give up their sovereignty in
security and defence?
16. In principle, intelligence has always been a
rypically national activity aimed at detecting and
analysing all possible risks and threats which
could do harm to the interests of a state or even
threaten its existence, from either within or
without. The fruits of intelligence enable a state to
conduct a responsible foreign, security and
defence policy.
17. Although a fully-fledged supranational
European intelligence policy may still have a long
way to go because of national sensitivitieso there
are possibilities for a Europeanisation of intelli-
gence. Obviously, the level of such Europeanisa-
tion depends on the degree of convergence of
national interests of the states concerned. As
member states of the European Union move
towards a common foreign and security policy,
they will need a common intelligence policy in
order to be able to identify risks and threats to
their common interests. At the moment, however,
a pragmatic step-by-step approach seems to be the
only viable way to attain this ultimate objective.
18. The long list of Europe's intelligence require-
ments mentioned above makes it clear that, with
the present severe budget consffaints, no single
national intelligence service will be able to meet
the many justifred demands. Cooperation and task
specialisation are inevitable if the purpose is to
turn available resources to maximum account.
New technology, which will facilitate the collec-
tion and analysis of data is also, very often, too
expensive for individual nations to afford. This is
true not only of observation satellite systems but
also of information technology and high-capacity,l. le Monde,l8 April 1996.
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secure data links. A system should be developed
which would allow for a gradual increase in the
sharing of data and resources, given that this
could not be done overnight. A frst step could be
to second a correspondent from each countqr's
national intelligence service to the Planning Cell
in order to improve its abitity to make up-to-date
assessments and analyses of the situation in
potential Petersberg-task theaffes of operation.
19. The common foreign and security policy,
ultimately to include a common defence policy,
will not be achieved until convergence of the dif-
ferent national assessments of specific foreign
and security policy issues becomes possible. In
this respect, a serious effort is needed to integrate
national intelligence analyses into a coherent
European picture.
20. In this framework, mention should be made
of the European Commission's recommendations
for the European Union intergovernmental confe-
rence. The Commission has suggested setting up a
Presidency-Commission team in order to ensure
effective cooperation between the two institutions
in the field of the common foreign and security
policy.
2L In order to prepare decisions more thor-
oughly, the Commission has proposed establi-
shing a common analysis cell, composed of
experts from member states and from the Com-
mission. It would be a common service, which
could eventually profit from a contribution from
WEU 
'.
III. Is the CITF concept the ultimate solution
for Europe's intelligence deftciencies ?
22. It has been repeated endlessly that because
of the existing complementarity and transparency
between NAIO and WEU, there is no need for
duplication. On the other hand, the agreement on
combined joint task forces (CJTF), which is
expected to be approved by the North Atlantic
Council in Berlin in June 1996, could give rise to
some reservations on this point.
23. It is common knowledge that serious short-
comings in intelligence gathering and processing
in the armed forces of the European allies were
among the main reasons for establishing CJTF.
CJTF should enable Europeans to use Alliance
assets, including the impressive array of US intel-
ligence assets, in European-led military operations
in which ttre United States does not participate.
24. The command structure for CJTF which
now seems to have been agreed, with a supported
commander of the European-led operation and a
supporting commander to provide Alliance assets
for such operations, leaves doubt as to whether
Europeans will under all circumstances be able to
rely on the availability of these assets. Given the
fact that the supporting commander, who is sup-
posed to be a US officer, will be able to take
conffol, the case may arise where the supporting
commander will either not provide the full range
of intelligence assets required, or will withdraw
these assets from the theatre. In that case, the
European-supported commander may have to
decide to cancel the operation.
25. There can be no doubt that under present
circumstances, CJTF are a vital element for Euro-
pean-led operations without the participation of
the United States.
26. The NATO-led IFOR operation has trig-
gered an impressive range of US intelligence acti-
vities. The results of those activities are at the dis-
posal of other IFOR contingents in so far as they
will need them for the smooth running of their
part of the operation. The distribution of intelli-
gence data takes place at the discretion of the
owner of the assets used. In the US section in
north-eastern Bosnia, well over 1000 army intelli-
gence froops are deployed, while a national intel-
ligence support team at the US headquarters in
Tizla includes representatives from the CIA, the
Defence Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency.
27. A number of satellites are tracking any
movements of military equipment through the
demilitarised zones separating the factions. Intelli-
gence-gathering assets being used include Quick-
fix, an EH-60 helicopter which collects elecffonic
signals, and Guardrail, an army intelligence targe-
ting system. Also employed are US Air Force
JSTARS to monitor arms smuggling activities.
Listening posts, seismic, infrared and magnetic
sensors have been installed and patrolling troops
are engaged in poinrblank surveillance.
28. All these assets have now been deployed at
full strength because, after years of serious diffe-
rences of opinion with the Europeans, the United
States has decided to become involved in the cri-
sis in Bosnia, even to the point of deploying US
troops on the ground.
29. Europeans may have to recognise, how-
ever, that for the implementation of their cornmon
foreign, security and defence policy they may not
be able to rely forever on the provision of US
assets. The development ofpurely European oper-
ational capabilities should therefore be one of
WEU's priorities, and it should go hand in hand
with the provision of Alliance assets through
CJTF in the field of intelligence. A tully-fledged
intelligence system, ranging from different mili-
tary satellites to intelligence processing and
gathering centres and including direct links with
C4I systems, would take years to develop and2. lz Mon^de,27 February 1996.
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commission, even though the European defence
industry has all the basic technologies available to
build the components.
30. Presenrday military operations cannot be
successful without the use of comprehensive C4I
systems to acquire intelligence and manage all
control, command, communications, computer
and intelligence operations. NAIO has its own air
command and control system (ACCS), which is
matched by the compatible French surveillance
and command system for aerial operations
(SCCOA). The most sophisticated system for air-
ground surveillance, the United States JSTARS,
has no competitor at the moment but thought must
now be given to a future successor. France has
developed a helicopter-mounted Horizon battle-
field surveillance system and it is now being pro-
posed that, using technology it has at its disposal,
the European defence industry develop a full air-
ground surveillance system including a JSTARS
successor to be operational after 2005. This could
be done in cooperation with the United States
defence indusfiry, provided it is based on a satis-
factory two-way agreement, and in such a way as
to complement European systems under develop-
ment, such as Horizon, Astor (United Kingdom)
and Creso (Italy), for a new transatlantic system.
Europe should not delay in making up its mind in
this matter.
IV. Towards a European observation
satellite system
31. A frst important step towards the setting-
up of a corrmon European intelligence system
was taken when the WEU Council decided to
establish a WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n,
Spain, in order to provide satellite image intelli-
gence for verification and crisis-monitoring pur-
poses. In the initial experimental phase, the Satel-
lite Centre worked with satellite data which it
acquired on a commercial basis from various
European and foreign sources. In May 1995, the
Satellite Centre was confirmed as a permanent
body of WEU. A basic agreement, as formulated
in the Memorandum of Understanding of 17 April
1993, has been signed, enabling the Satellite
Centre to use Helios 1 images, but further practi-
cal details still have to be worked out.
32. While the realisation of the idea of a WEU
Satellite Centre with the right to use Helios 1
images for interpretation purposes is politically
praiseworthy, there are clearly many practical
problems to be solved in order to respect the many
security and priority user constraints attached to
the operation of Helios 1, which is in fact a satel-
lite operated by three participating countries
(France, Italy and Spain) each of which has its
own interests as regards images.
33. The present operation of the Torrej6n
Centre still leaves much to be desired, not just on
account of shortcomings which have become
apparent in the choice of equipment but more par-
ticularly because of the delays involved in the
interpretation and use of the images. Moreover,
one still has the impression that the WEU Coun-
cil's support for the Satellite Cenffe is not whole-
hearted owing to differences of opinion between
member states, which are resulting in the lowest
common denominator for the Centre's objectives
and terms of reference. A point to note here is that
it took the Council six months to provide a very
incomplete and unsatisfactory reply to a detailed
written question by Mr Lenzer3 on the work of the
Cenffe.
34. Observation satellites have the great advan-
tage of being free of the legal constraints which
apply to reconnaissance aircraft and thereby
accommodate coverage of all territories without
violating air space and, for the moment, without
the risk of being desftoyed.
35. They perform an extremely wide range of
tasks: monitoring crises, providing advance war-
ning of aggression, monitoring the application of
di sarmament treaties, supervising humanitarian
peace missions and gathering strategic and tacti-
cal data.
36. It is well known that optical observation
satellites such as Spot and Helios t have only
limited capabilities because they cannot see in the
dark or through clouds. A full observation satel-
lite system should therefore also comprise infra-
red and radar sensors. In the more distant future, a
European satellite system may also have to
include weather, communications, location/navi-
gation, early warning, eavesdropping and data-
relay satellites.
37. [t should be supplemented by ground sta-
tions and data-processing tools linked to battle-
field sensors for real-time processing, decision-
making and the ability to strike.
38. At their summit meeting of 7 December
1995 in Baden-Baden, France and Germany
agreed to cooperate closely in the field of satel-
lites. The main focus of Franco-Gennan coopera-
tion will be the development of a FF 11 000 mil-
lion Helios 2 observation sateltte with France as
lead contractor, a FF 13 000 million Horus radar
observation satellite with Germany as lead
contractor and a cooperative study with regard to
the possible development of data-relay satellites.
39. Helios 2, due to replace Helios 1 after the
year 2000, will include many improvements, such
as night observation with its infrared capability.
After the year 2005, the Horus radar observation
3. Question No. 331 of 30 May 1995.
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satellite will provide an all-weather day and night
observation capability.
40. Clearly, the Franco-German satellite
cooperation programme is an important step
towards the emergence of a European satellite
system. Both partners share the conviction that a
common European security and defence policy, in
particular in the fields of crisis prevention, crisis
management and peacekeeping obliges Euro-
peans to have a reliable and independent space
observation capability at their disposal. Both
France and Germany are prepared to share their
satellite cooperation progftlrnme with other WEU
member states.
41. At its meeting in Madrid on 14 November
1995, the WEU Ministerial Council instructed its
Space Group to define the basic conditions for
" possible WEU participation in a developing
multilateral European progftrrnme and to study
questions related to a possible WEU ground seg-
ment, taking account of existing ground segnents
within WEU nations ".
42. Many questions regarding relations bet-
ween WEU and Helios 2 are being dealt with in
the report on this subject by the Technological and
Aerospace Committee, submitted by Mr l*rzeq
Rapporteur.
43. The Council further noted that " In the
meantime, WEU will continue its activities with
the procurement of satellite imagery. " Finally, it
o'warmly welcomed the Hellenic Republic's par-
ticipation in WEU space activities and the fact
that associate members may now participate in
such activities in accordance with their status ".
4. The Satellite Cenffe and other WEU space
activities should certainly be welcomed as a step
towards a common European intelligence policy
but, at the same time, it should be noted that satel-
lite intelligence as now used by the Centre is
mainly useful for providing background informa-
tion on, among other things, ffiastructure. Much
remains to be done before the Centre will be a real
operational tool in European crisis management.
45. Moreover, it should also be noted that, in
general, satellite observation is only one of many
sources of intelligence. The results it produces, if
combined skilfully, analysed and continuously
updated, could provide the information needed for
a reasonable and accountable common foreign,
security and defence policy.
V, The Intelligence Sectian
in the WEU Planning Cell
46. In the framework of its policy to enhance
WEU's operational capabilities, the WEU Coun-
cil, in its Petersberg Declaration, also decided to
establish a military Planning Cell, which began
work in 1993. In 1994 however, the Council,
aware of the far too limited field of action of the
Planning Cell in its initial shape and size, initiated
preliminary studies for a situation centre and an
intelligence section, being of the opinion that
" the Secretariat and Planning Cell needed to be
complemented by capacities in the area of intelli-
gence and crisis management in order to fulfilthe
tasks mandated by the Petersberg Declaration ".
47. In May 1995, the Council meeting in Lis-
bon took note of a document on " Intelligence
support in the Planning Cell short-term
measures " without further comment. The Coun-
cil's Madrid Declaration, adopted on 14 Novem-
ber, stated the following:
" Ministers took note of and welcomed the
Secretary-General's study on the situation
centre and the intelligence section in the
Planning Cell, as well as the preparatory
measures for its implementation, such as
the setting-up of a project team, and the
necessary budgetary provisions. They
constitute an important step in the sfieng-
thening of WEU's operational capabilities.
Ministers look fonvard to the establishment
of the situation centre and its complete
implementation for phase tr of " WEU Cri-
sex 95-96 ". "
48. Although it should be recognised that the
Council is very well aware of WEU's short-
comings in the area of intelligence, it seems that
only little progress is being made in this field that
is vital both for the development of a common
foreign and security policy and for the develop-
ment of WEU's operational capabilities and
which should enable it to play its role as the
defence arm of the European Union and imple-
ment the tasks set out in the Petersberg Declara-
tion.
49. At its meeting in Madrid on 14 November
1995, the WEU Council approved a document
with the title " European security: a common
concept of the27 WEU countries ".
50. In this document, the WEU countries made
an effort to identiff the common interests of Euro-
peans, the risks and potential threats, and Euro-
pe's responsibilities as regards security and stabi-
lity both in Europe and in the rest of the world.
51. The document rightly concludes that " as
the defence component of the European Union
and as a means to strengthen the European pillar
of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is in a position to
respond to many of the challenges identified in
the politico-military field ".
52. At the same time it recognises, however,
that there are still gaps and deficiencies which are
inhibiting WEU from undertaking large-scale
operations. Reconnaissance and intelligence are
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among the important deficiencies identified in the
document. [t says that there is a need for WEU:
oo to establish or have access to an adequate
observation capability and to develop an
intelligence-processing capability which
are decisive for the conduct ofoperations in
complex, shifting, politico-military envi-
ronments. "
53. When addressing the Assembly of WEU in
December 1995, the French Minister for Euro-
pean Affairs, Michel Barnier, said that the deve-
lopment of operational capabilities required conti-
nuing efforts in the fields of space and armaments
cooperation in order for WEU to have a real intel-
ligence policy at its disposal 4.
54. Seen against the background of this recom-
mendation, the Intelligence Section in its present
form is indeed an exremely modest body. Wor-
king with a staff of five, the section's main task is
filing the intelligence data it receives. This data is
provided by some member states on a voluntary
basis with a degree of classification chosen by
each nation. There is agreement that the Intelli-
gence Section only provides an analysis of the
intelligence data in its files at the request of the
Council.
55. In principle, the intelligence provided by
member states is to be used as part of the Planning
Cell's generic planning. Proposals have now been
worked out, ready for approval by the Council, to
give the Intelligence Section a role in intelligence
support for operations, again based on the intelli-
gence provided on a voluntary base by member
states.
56. Although the Planning Cell's Intelligence
Section and the Satellite Centre are connected by
computer, there is still a need to formalise
contacts, including the possibility of the Planning
Cell giving the Satellite Cenfte orders, subject to
the agreement of the member states, on the satel-
lite programme.
57. At present, intelligence in WEU is still in
the making and an intelligence policy, including
the means for making an autonomous WEU ana-
lyses, has not yet been defined because of a lack
of political will in the member states.
58. In the future, WEU should be able to pro-
vide its political authorities with an assessment of
the srarcgic situation in areas where they might
have to act in order to prevent conflicts. Decisions
are needed now to enable WEU to provide its own
security analysis as a building block for the Euro-
pean common foreign and security policy by the
year 2000.
59. In relations with NATO, complementarity
and transparency between WEU and NATO
should be taken for granted and since both organi-
sations have common areas of general interest,
they have the same basic intelligence require-
ments. A dialogue between WEU and NAIO on
intelligence is under way. Recently, the WEU
Planning Cell participated in a meeting of the
NATO Intelligence Board.
60. A regular exchange of intelligence docu-
ments will take place as soon as the long-awaited
security agreement between WEU and NAIO has
been signed and enters into force. Conclusion of
this agreement is expected to take place in June
1996. One of the problems in negotiating the
agreement has been that NAIO, understandably,
wanted guarantees as to a clear distinction in the
distribution of exchanged documents to, on the
one hand, WEU's members and associate mem-
bers and on the othel WEU's observers and asso-
ciate partners.
61. In the exchange of documents with NAIO,
it is agreed that a pragmatic step-by-step approach
will lead to the best results. In a first stage, docu-
ments on a few specific areas of obvious interest
will be exchanged. The range of subjects and
areas of interest could gradually be extended at a
later stage.
62. At the Intelligence Section it has been sug-
gested that a further useful development in its
work could be the creation of an [ntelligence
Division consisting of ten staff members who,
after a NATO training course, could provide ana-
lyses on the basis of intelligence messages sent by
member states to both NATO and WEU simulta-
neously. For important issues, common briefings
for member state representatives could be organi-
sed by WEU and NATO.
VI. Conclusian:
What might a real WEU intelligence
policy consist ofl
63. Following the WEU summit meeting in
Madrid, it is necessary, taking the creation of a
real Intelligence Section within the Planning Cell
as a starting point, to agree on measures that
would give WEU real autonomy in intelligence,
so that the Council has all the information it
requires to assume responsibility for deploying
forces answerable to WEU in any operation it
decides to conduct.
@. An intelligence policy should naturally fall
within the more general framework of a defence
policy that alone establishes the strategic interests
for the purpose of which all resources, including
intelligence resources, should be deployed,
unobstructed and unhindered by the principle of
" non-duplication " which is often conveniently
used as an excuse for preventing any operational
structuring of WEU independently of NATO.4. Address to the WEU Assembly, 6 December 1995.
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65. Negotiations with NATO should start forth-
with to link the seat of WEU with NAIO's protec-
ted telecommunications networks and to secure
access by the Cell to NATO intelligence data-
bases.
66. It is not too soon to envisage a WEU intel-
ligence policy even though the objectives of the
much publicised defence policy agreed at Maas-
fticht have not yet been clearly defined.
67. The Council is a body which should be
capable of taking decisions necessary for the
defence of common interests case by case, even in
the absence of a formal defence policy, assessing
each one on a wholly independent basis.
68. For missions involving a given area WEU
has more chance of obtaining useful planning
information from member states with a thorough
knowledge of that area than from NAIO.
69. WEU has, if it wished to use it, more infor-
mation than it supposes, especially since the com-
missioning of the Satellite Centre at Torrej6n. It is
therefore a mafter of establishing a few short-term
objectives that would be useful to it. In order to
define such objectives more precisely, three types
of intelligence are necessary to render WEU
operational.
(i) Documentary intelligence 
- 
including
all permanen! gq_o.graphical, political,
economic and military data and insta-
bility factors (political and religious)
making for an assessment of the risk
of the emergence of threats or the out-
break of crises.
(ii) Operational situation intelligence
necessary to those in charge of carry-
ing out an operation.
Each member state having its own
resources should establish bilateral
links between its own services and the
Intelligence Section in the Planning
Cell, providing weekly analyses and
situation messages. The creation of a
real intelligence section would allow a
WEU group of intelligence experts to
be formed. The second objective
would be to give the Cell some sort of
intelligence-processing capability by
putting it in contact with national
intelligence agencies and with the
Satellite Cenfre. NATO might supply
substantial amounts of data, in order
to avoid duplication.
(iii) Tal<ng Tonej6n as a starting point, it
will be necessary to quickly acquire
an independent space capability to
free Europeans from their dependence
on the United States for intelligence
which may be given or withheld but
which in any event is selective and sif-
ted by NATO.
70. Because of matters of urgency, priorities
and rapid developments, operational situation
intelligence calls for a different organisation of
the Planning Cell. Once again this raises the issue
of WEU's need for a real permanent headquarters
and chief-of-staff.
71. Immediate exploitation of operational
intelligence would require a different structure for
the small " Intelligence Section in the Planning
Cell ", but it would have to adapt to each indivi-
dual operation. The " pilot state " for the opera-
tion would provide the operation commander.
72. There can be no defence organisation
without an intelligence service. This is consis-
tently borne out by military history.
73. This also applies to WEU's common
defence policy.
74. There should be no illusion about the geo-
strategic upheaval that has taken place over the
last four years and the disintegration of the USSR.
With the emergence of new threats such as
conflicts of the Bosnian type, nuclear prolifera-
tion, terrorism, drugs and international crime, the
overwhelming need for intelligence is more acute
than ever. As Auguste Comte put it, action
depends on forecasts and the more information
there is, the better the forecasts.
75. Since intelligence is a lengthy business, all
sources of information whether " open " (newspa-
pers, radio, etc.) or confidential, human or com-
puter generated, should be used to gather as much
information as possible using the proper facilities,
so that it can be used as quickly as possible.
76. [f intelligence is to be credible and reliable,
advantage should be taken of the clear comple-
mentarity of human resources and technical facili-
ties, particularly computer and satellite techno-
logy.
77. Intelligence gathering should not be confi-
ned to specific targets but must include and put in
order all types of information available in the
political, humano economic, and religious fields
and should also cover mainly unclassified mili-
tary information.
78. For a very long time, intelligence was a
technique based on information provided by
humans for mainly military purposes.
79. Today, it is an essential component of deci-
sions that naturally include military aspects but
also go much further in view of the existence of
new threats and economic, political and religious
confrontations.
80. This new international landscape offers
enorrnous scope for research and analysis. The
10
DocuIvcNI 1517
contribution intelligence will make to crisis
management and decision-making will have no
precedent provided we abandon the universally
held raditional but artificial image of espionage
and counter-espionage, which is more the stuff of
novels and films than of reality.
81. In its efforts to establish a European intelli-
gence policy, WEU should be on its guard against
two dangers: exposing itself to the criticism of
duplicating what has been done in NATO, and
counteracting what might be seen as the preroga-
tives and interests of its member states. As regards
duplication, WEU should smive to gain access to
NATO databases and extend its data-gathering
efforts to cover a wider range of areas (economic,
religious, cultural, etc.) and geographic zones
(outside the former Soviet bloc). To avoid any
interference with national interests, WEU should
in the first instance concenfrate on making use of
non-classffied documentation and should only use
its own sources (the Satellite Centre) for matters
on which there is consensus among its member
states.
82. In this context the recent signature of a
" security agreement " between WEU and NAtrO
is a small but significant step forward since it
accommodates agreement on the procedures
governing the classification of confidential docu-
ments and their communication codes with a view
to adopting NAf,O standards for future military
operations carried out by Europeans.
83. In the distinction generally drawn between
documentary intelligence and situation intelli-
gence, WEU's first priority should therefore go to
the former. It would then be ready to supply situa-
tion intelligence as soon as the political and/or
military circumstances allowed and required it.
(a) The Intelligence Centre
84. To implement this policy, the Organisation
needs a centre operating under far less restrictive
arrangements than those that apply to the lntelli-
gence Section in the Planning Cell. It is not so
much the Section's resources that are to blame as
the actual conditions in which it operates. At pres-
ent, it cannot begin to study a subject or region
until the Organisation has offlrcially declared it an
object of intelligence. But by then it is far too late
as it takes several weeks to gather the relevant
information and draw up a useful sunmary report.
The Intelligence Centre must be authorised to deal
with zones of potential conflict precisely in order
to inform the Council 
- 
and, if necessary, the
countries concerned 
- 
about the emergence of a
crisis.
85. This would mean that the Organisation
would not be taking a neutral stance and therein
lie certain dangers. In a zone of potential conflict
involving one or more member states, it or they
could accuse WEU of interfering in their domes-
tic affairs. That is why the Centre should begin by
gathering information contained in unclassified
documentation only. Since such documentation is
accessible to everyone, it could be considered as
being politically neutral.
86. From the outset, the range of possibilities
to be explored is vast. The fust thing that needs to
be done it to collect geographical documents
(maps, digitised terrain data, etc.), which are a
prerequisite for any investigation. This is not
to say that such an exercise is not intelligence-
gathering proper because a precise map with fine
detail is in itself a precious source of intelligence
and as such is considered to be classified informa-
tion in many countries. This is an area in which
complementarity with NATO can play a role,
as can collaboration with states. However, long-
standing bilateral agreements in this area leave
little scope for requests from an organisation
which, for the time being, has nothing to offer in
exchange.
87. Investigations could then encompass eco-
nomic, social, culnral and religious aspects, with
an emphasis on what is often considered to be of
secondary importance by national intelligence
services. In fact, intelligence services the world
over operate on a barter basis with each striving to
obtain exclusive information it can then exchange
with other services in possession of intelligence to
which it cannot gain access.
88. The WEU Centre will not be able to offer
original intelligence since it will mainly be wor-
king with unclassified documentation but its
highly detailed analyses based on the information
it collects will result in a high value-added pro-
duct that could be exchanged.
89. What the WEU Intelligence Centre there-
fore needs are not so much intelligence specialists
in the military sense (contact men) as informa-
tion-processing professionals. It will be necessary
to process a vast mass of data emanating from all
types of media including the most up-to-date
(such as the Internet and digital television) and
draw up summary reports that are required by
WEU bodies or can be used as bartering tender.
90. If it is organised in this way, the Intelli-
gence Centre will be able to conduct intelligence-
gathering effectively, using its own resources
- 
with the Satellite Centre foremost among them 
-
either to supplement the documentary intelligence
it already possesses or to obtain situation intelli-
gence if the situation so requires and if the sensors
used are capable of providing it. It should be
noted in passing that, 4s things currently stand, in
the case of a request for a dossier from a WEU
body, the task can justify a request for Helios
images, which is not the case for a task initiated
by a national request.
ll
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91. Finally, a solution needs to be found to the
difficult problem of access to classified informa-
tion produced or obtained by the Centre. Will it be
accessible to all the states (members, associate
members, associate partnerso etc.), and to WEU
bodies (the Council, Committee of Chiefs of
Defence Staff, etc.) or will it only be specific sum-
mary reports that are supplied to targeted reci-
pients without revealing anything about the
sources used to obtain them? This is a question
that requires an answer because it determines not
only the Centre's credibility but control over its
operations as well.
(b) The Satellite Centre
92. The Satellite Centre has to be seen as being
a valuable instrument the Intelligence Centre can
use to apply the Organisation's intelligence
policy, rather than as an independent intelligence
centre.
93. Satellite observation of the Earth is only
one precious source of information and image
interpreters cannot be asked to produce conclu-
sions when that task should be done by those
whose job it is to draw up summary reports based
on a set of sources. Furthermore, if it is the inten-
tion that the Centre should supply relevant and
detailed dat4 requests should be accompanied by
geographic information (such as maps, etc.) and,
depending on the case, by economic, military or
social data. There is therefore a need for close
links to be established between the Intelligence
Centre and the Satellite Cenfre.
94. However, whereas the Satellite Cenfre has
been in operation for four years, the Intelligence
Cenfre is still only a concept based on the Intelli-
gence Section in the Planning Cell. Should the
Sateltte Centre simply stand by waiting until the
Intelligence Centre is ready to make use of it? Of
course it shouldn't! Instead, it should make prepa-
rations to ensure that it acts as effectively as pos-
sible when the time comes.
95. As the Satellite Centre does not have the
same operating constraints as national centres, it
could strive to become a recognised centre of
excellence in Europe. In order to do so it will have
to concentrate on its task of developing the most
modern techniques of image interpretation and
processing. In so doing, it should attract the best
European specialists and, through their work and
the techniques they use, develop or update the
expertise of a whole generation of image analysts.
This endeavour should be supported by equip-
ment (hardware and software) that is constantly
upgraded to the latest state of the art. This it not to
say that the Centre's current equipment is defi-
cient is is design but in this particular area tech-
nology develops so quickly that there is a new
generation every four to five years.
96. To keep in touch with reality, these tech-
niques will have to be used to address issues rele-
vant to the Organisation but, in order to avoid the
two pitfalls of duplication of national facilities
and the problem of obtaining auxiliary data, the
choice of tasks to be undertaken will have to be
very selective. It could, for instance, target envi-
ronmental questions; information on such matters
is more often than not to be found in unclassified
documentation and they are still rarely dealt with
by remote-sensing image analysis centres.
97. The shortcomings that came to light during
the Centre's experimental phase (1992-95) were
mainly due to deficiencies in the procurement of
quality images. The efforts made to make high-
resolution space imagery (from the Helios I satel-
Iite or Russian military systems) available within
a reasonable time are praiseworthy but insuffi-
cient. WEU must acquire an independent satellite
data-acquisition system. This does not mean it has
to be a comprehensive system including, among
other things, specialised space sensors, but it must
at least be a ground segment sharing resources
with other national programme users or using
them on a cooperative basis.
98. If an intelligence policy were to be imple-
mented in WEU in this way, it would provide
Europe with the wherewithal to make a significant
contribution to the establishment of peace and
security on its territory.
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